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ay

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JIS J. MONTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

iTZER'S SPECIALTY B~EAD
IOMPANY, a corporation

12810

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION
BRIEF
~spondent
~ing

AND
FOR REHEARING

respectfully petitiomthis court for a re-

in this matter on the grounds set forth below and

Bupport thereof submits the following brief:
1) This court erred in assuming that Continental Bak[Company terminated its business with Kratzers for rea~ other than the tort committed by Monter. The only
lon given was the closing of the business by· Monter.
1

~ 2) This court erred in stating that the monthly sales
Fatzers to Continental were reduced "so that the
tage was only $2, 000. 00 per month. " The evidence was
fsales to Continental were $2,000.00 per month in
ember, 1971 although they had been higher in the past.

3) This court erred in holding that the lower court's
flllent was based upon speculation.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amore complete statement of facts is found in ResponBrief but most of the facts important to this petition
briefly given here.
1

it's

This action was initially brought by Monter under the
,awful detainer statute for default in rent payments. A
'ault judgment was entered giving Monter possession of the
iperty. No judgment was given for rent nor was it prayed
:, Monter caused an execution to be served upon Kratzers
1
had the sheriff close the business, evict all employees and
nge
the locks on the doors. This court has upheld the
1
1er court's determination that the judgment was void for
.lure to determine the amount of rent due and the execution
aviolation of Kratzers' rights under the unlawful dener statute. Kratzers is therefore entitled to any rehng damages.
1

1

While Kratzers place of business was closed down, Contiital Baking Company, a customer of Kratzers for more than
!teen years, was unable to call its orders into Kratzers.
hnental' s Sales Manager, Jack Hart, thereupon personally
t to Kratzers' Bakery, found the premises locked and noy present and then placed their orders with another bakery.
~that day on, in spite of Kratzer' s at tempts to regain its
~ness, Continental has refused to buy from Kratzer' s bese, in view of the closing of the business, it had no
~mce that it would continue to get products from Kratzers.
hough Continental had experienced some quality and delivery
Hems with Kratzer' s, Mr. Hart testified that these were
iidered normal and typical of other bakers as well. He
iher testified that Continental would not have terminated
long-standing relationship with Kratzer' s except for
lr inability to obtain products on November 8, 1971, and
had this incident on November 8, 1971, been the only incite occur, Continental would still have terminated the
unt.
It was stipulated at the trial that sales by Kratzer' s
:ontinental were $2,000.00 per month and that $1,060.00 of
lwas profit. Based upon the evidence that the business
ltionship between Kratzer' s _and Continental would not have

3
t erminated except for the actions of Monter, the lower
·t entered judgment for the present value of $1,060.00
.
r~ month over ten years into
t h e f uture.
1n

By its opinion filed December 5, 1972, this court rersed the judgment for damages for loss of business claiming
tit was based upon speculation. The opinion makes certain
:tements which are in error and the court's reliance upon
im caused an improper reversal of the judgment for damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT CONTINENTAL BAKING COMIT TERMINATED ITS BUSINESS WITH KRATZERS FOR REASONS OTHER
Ul THE TORT COMMITTED BY MONTER. THE ONLY REASON GIVEN WAS
I CLOSING OF THE BUSINESS BY MONTER.
This court's opinion referred to some prior quality and
.ivery problems that Continental had with Kratzers and a
ltement that this entered into the decision to terminate the
1ount with Kratzers in assuming that Monter was not entirely
~Mible for Kratzer's loss of business.
In doing so this
1rt ignores the trial court's discretion to believe or disiieve the testimony of a witness whose demeanor and other
)tors are observed by it. This court also ignores all of
1 other evidence proving that Monter' s
actions were the sole
~on for terminating the account.
Following the testimony
Jack Hart quoted in this court's opinion is this statement
129):

"Q Had this incident on November the 8th been the

only incident to occur in your experience, would
you have terminated the account?

A

I think, under the conditions that existed that
day, yes."

On page 125 of the record Mr. Hart testified as follows:

" He called
wanted me to
the business
lar day; and

me while I was in Provo, Utah, and
give him more business, or give him back
that we had switched over that particuI stated that I didn't feel that we

4
could, because I had no assurance that we would continue to get products from him, in view of what had
happene d . "
ther on page 128 of the record Mr. Hart stated that the

~lity and delivery problems were normal and that they had the
ne problems with other bakers as well.

Then it was stated:

"Q In spite of those other problems you have mentioned
was your inability to get products on November the
8th the reason for your termination of your business
with Kratzer's?
A Yes, I'd say so.
Q Would it be fair to say that you would not have
terminated that relationship then except for that
inability?
A Yes."

There can be no other conclusion from the above testimony
that the sixteen-plus year relationship with Continental
~d have continued indefinitely into the future except for
wrongful actions of Monter. There was absolutely no evi1ce to the contrary offered by Monter.
The trial court was
uly justified in finding that Monter was the cause of this
~ of business and it was error for this court to disturb
t finding on appellate review.
See Charlton v. Rackett,
gtah 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176 (1961).

ITT

POINT II
THIS COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE MONTHLY SALES BY
rZERS TO CONTINENTAL WERE REDUCED "SO THAT THE AVERAGE WAS
~ ~2,000.00 PER MONTH." THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT SALES TO CON~NTAL WERE $2,000.00 PER MONTH IN NOVEMBER, 1971 ALTHOUGH
,HAD BEEN HIGHER IN THE PAST.

I In

three separate places the court's opinion refers to the
'ulation of the parties that average monthly sales to Contital were $2 ,000. 00 per month and then assumes that, because
ls had been $5,000.00 per month at one time in the past,
tmust have been substantially below $2,000.00 in November,
I and therefore the future sales might be even less or nonltent.

5
, In the first place the stipulation of the parties was
it the average gross business done with Continental through· the year would be $2,000.00 per month (R. 153). This
[ulation was made for the purpose of avoiding the necessity
iengthy and detailed proof and to allow the court to rely
that figure as the monthly loss to Kratzer' s to occur in
i future if the court found in favor of Kratzers on the
;ue of liability. The court should not go beyond this
.pulation of the parties. It takes the place of a finding
fact that the loss to Kratzer' s would be $2 ,000. 00 per
ith in the future.
It involves no speculation by the court
iis the agreed upon figure to be used in calculating dam!s ,fter the issue of liability is determined. The parties
imselves considered all of the factors involved in arriving
the stipulated figure, any increases or declines through: the year, seasonal variations, etc. The stipulation it.f removed all matters of speculation from the court. It
1 only the stipulated figure
to rely upon.

' To

further counter the court's assumption that sales in
ternber, 1971 were substantially less than $2,000.00 per
1th, the testimony of Mr. Yeck on page 159 of the record
1ressly states that $2, 000. 00 per month was the volume of
liness done with them "now" - meaning at the time of termilion of the account.
POINT III
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT'S

k;MENT WAS BASED UPON SPECULATION.
1

It is general law that future damages cannot be based
n speculation. There must be some basis upon which to calate those damages. However, this court enters into a high
\ree of speculation when it decides that, because the rela-.
ln~ship between Kratzers and Continental could have been terated at any time, it would have been terminated and thereKratzers is not entitled to any damages. There is no
dence to indicate that either party would have terminated
~relationship.
All the evidence is to the contrary. As
~n by the testimony quoted in Point I above, it was termied because of Monter's actions and would not have been ter1ated except for Monter's actions. That indicates only that
~ long-standing relationship would have continued indefiJely.

I

6
It should be kept in mind that Monter committed a wrong
·nst Kratzer' s and it is obvious that Kratzer' s suffered a
Jga1
l 6 because of it. No one can know how long Continental would
~~e done business with Kratzers just as no one can know how
:ong the family "bre~dw~nner" would ha':7e lived in a. wrongful
leath action. Yet, it is the prerogative of the trier of
, cts to determine that q ues ti on in assessing damages. Here,
~e trier of facts determined that the relationship would have
:ontinued for at least ten more years and assessed damages
iccordingly. This court might decide that five years or two
rears or even twenty years was a more likely period of time.
iut it would have continued for some period of time and there:ore some damages should be allowed.
,

Reference is made to the authorities cited in Point III of
~~ondent's brief to the effect that uncertainty merely as to
'he amount of lost profits does not prevent recovery and the
[efendant is not allowed to insist on absolute certainty when
!s wrongful act prevents determination of exact damages.
In
ha; situation lost profits can be
determined by reasonable inerence as the lower court did here. In Freeway Park Building,
~c. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451
, 2d 778 (1969), this court stated that the jury should be
bowed to determine lost profits where there• was less evidence
nsupport thereof than there is present here. Prior earnings
Fe not known exactly and no evidence of future earnings was
~ven yet the jury should be allowed to "infer" the amount of
amages. The court's opinion here amounts to an overruling of
~at case and therefore should be reconsidered in a rehearing
f the matters referred to herein.
"Reasonable inference"
snot speculation in the legal sense.
CONCLUSION

i
i For the reasons above stated, respondent respectfully
ays that this court grant a rehearing in order that it may
consider its opinion herein and allow respondent damages
r the wrongful actions committed by appellant.

l

7

Respectfully submitted,

BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK

Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for Defendant. Respondent

